[i] The Chinese name for the game is weiqi, the first character of the title is a variant of qi, pronounced go in Japan. Since most English speakers familiar with the game have studied it with Japanese terminology, for the sake of clarity, I use Go instead of weiqi, and try to apply the appropriate Japanese terms where applicable.]

[ii] One key being that black pieces are not called “black pieces” 黑子, but “raven pieces” 烏子. Cheng found that “black” was part of the childhood name of one of the Northern Zhou emperors. Traditionally, one cannot use a character in an emperors name out of respect, and so must substitute another character for that which is to be avoided. In Northern Zhou, “Black River” and “Black Peak” were referred to as “Raven River” and “Raven Peak” to avoid the taboo character “black.” Cheng Enyuan, Dunhuang Qi Jing Jian Zheng [An Examination of The Dunhuang "Classic of Go"] Chengdu : Shu Rong qi yi chu ban she : Sichuan sheng xin hua shu dian fa xing, 1990), 95.

[iii] Anonymous, "敦煌棋經," CCC Yenching College, http://go.yenching.edu.hk/dh_txt1.htm.

[iv] All sources agree that there is missing text. Cheng Enyuan suggests that, based upon the average length of subsequent chapters, it is no more than 3-5 lines of text—about 45-75 characters. Cheng, 67.

[v] The reference “Ping” seems to be to the Late Qin-Early Han figure Chen Ping, who was one of Liu Bang’s companions in the wars to establish the Han dynasty. Ibid., 68.]

[vi] Original character is unclear. Cheng suggests it is a Northern Zhou variant of 壤. Ibid., 70.]

[vii]  Here shi (勢) is translated as “strategic advantage” following Roger Ames’s translation of Sun Tzu: The Art of War. The term, though, is multivalent. As Ames writes, “We must struggle to understand how shih can combine in one idea the following cluster of meanings:

1) aspect, situation, circumstances, conditions;

 2) disposition, configuration, outward shape;

3) force, influence, momentum, authority;

4) strategic advantage, purchase.” Sun Tzu: The Art of War, ed. and trans. Roger Ames, The Classics of Ancient China (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), 73. John Fairbairn has suggested “strong posture” as an alternative translation of this term, making a clearer connection to shapes. The key is that this term indicates a temporary advantage in a specific position at a specific moment. This strategic advantage can be enhanced or lost as the game continues; hence, timing is important. In the chapter entitled “Strategic Advantage,” Sun Tzu wrote, “That the velocity of cascading water can send boulders bobbing about is due to its strategic advantage. That a bird of prey when it strikes can smash its victim to pieces is due to its timing. So it is with the expert at battle that his strategic advantage is channeled and his timing is precise. His strategic advantage is drawn like a crossbow and his timing is like releasing the trigger.” ———, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, 120. Wang Xi, commenting on the term, wrote that the title Strategic Advantage “refers to the fluctuations in the accumulation of strategic advantage. The expert at battle is able to use strategic advantage to seize victory without taxing his strength.” Sun Tzu,  Sunzi shijia zhu [Ten Masters’ commentaries on the Sunzi], vol. 6 of Zhu Zi Ji Cheng [Collected Commentaries on the Various Masters] (Beijing: Zhong hua shu ju : Xin hua shu dian Beijing fa xing suo fa xing, 1954; reprint, 1990), 66. Strategic advantage depends upon preparation of the right shapes that will stay alive while supporting further encroachment. Perhaps underscoring this, the commentaries on the Sun Tzu note that the chapter “Strategic Advantage” logically follows the chapter on “Strategic Positions” (形). ]

[viii] Following Cheng, that 多 is a scribal error for 少, given the parallel phrases in later chapters and other Go texts.]

[ix] This line underscores the tension between Go and the Confucian ideals, which call for straightforward actions based on moral principles. Hence, some Confucians, including Confucius, considered Go a waste of time, or worse.]

[x] In 661 BC, Duke Xian of Jin paid the Duke of Yu for permission to send Jin’s army through Yu to attack the state of Guo, which he did successfully. In 654 BC, the Duke Xian again persuaded the Duke of Yu to give the Jin army passage through Yu to attack and destroy Guo. Upon accomplishing this, the Jin army returned, occupied Yu and annexed it. James Legge, ed. The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen (Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc.,1990), 145-7. The point being that the Duke of Yu did not suspect an ulterior motive for Jin’s request for permission to send its army through Yu.]

[xi]  The manuscript reads “若諸葛之行丘.” Many read 丘 as a variant of 兵, hence “like Zhuge [Liang’s] use of soldiers.” Cheng argues that, in fact, an obscure meaning of 丘is “empty,” and that this points to one of the most deceptive and successful strategies employed by Zhuge Liang in Romance of the Three Kingdoms. 成恩元, 敦煌碁经笺证 /Dunhuang Qi Jing Jian Zheng, 79-80. In one instance when his army was routed, Zhuge Liang knew that the city where he was could not repel an attack. So he sat himself above the city gate, playing the qin, opened the gates and had peasants leisurely sweeping the streets. When the attack came, the opposing general thought it was a trap, due to Zhuge’s famed planning, and withdrew. See Guanzhong Luo, Three Kingdoms : China's Epic Drama, trans. Moss Roberts, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), 285-89.]

[xii] [It is unclear whether the manuscript reads “encirclement” 圍 or “state” 國.]

[xiii] [The second chapter of this work is devoted to the ladder strategy (征).] 

[xiv] [Here the Chinese 先 is the same as the Japanese Go term “sente,” which could be translated as “upper hand,” or “momentum,” or “advantage.”]