



Figure 3 (101 - 163)



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

10: connects

Figure 3 (101 - 163)

White 8. White cannot extend at 1 in Dia. 7, as he is captured with Black 2 etc. This is where White loses points because of 44 in Figure 2.

Figure 4 (164 - 225)

Black 73. If at 1 in Dia. 8, White plays 2. If Black 4 next, he collapses when White plays 3,




Figure 4 (164 - 225)

so Black 3 is the only move. However, Black loses all his corner territory, as he is reduced to minimum eye-space.

Although there were middle game complications in which a small slip could have caused an upset, this game was decided in the first skirmish of the game. Hashimoto never recovered from his setback in the bottom left corner.

White resigns after Black 225.

4th Kisei Title

In the first game of the title match, given in the previous issue, Fujisawa Shuko got off to a good start in his title defence with a brilliant win. He did make a blunder late in the game, but the challenger, Rin Kaiho, failed to take advantage of it. In the second game Shuko had more to worry about than just his opponent. On the morning of the game he had a severe attack of lumbago and was unable to get out of bed by himself. A pain-killing injection enabled him to get to the playing-room just a couple of minutes late, but at times during the game he still seemed to be in considerable pain, though he kept assuring everyone that his 'brain was unaffected'. Whether or not his lumbago was to blame, Shuko soon got into strife.

Game Two

White: Fujisawa Shuko

Black: Rin Kaiho

komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each

date: 30th, 31st January, 1980

played at the Miyako Hotel in Kyoto




Figure 1 (1 - 43)


Figure 1 (1 – 43). A question of timing

The fuseki pattern of this game has become quite familiar recently. Both players played very quickly and Shuko took only nine minutes over his first thirty moves.

White 22. Shuko also considered 27.

White 24. The low move (rather than 'a') is correct because of Black's solid position in the bottom right corner.

White 32. The game began to slow up with this move, which Shuko considered for forty-seven minutes. This contact play has deep strategic significance, but its main aim is to reduce the value of a move by Black at 'b'. If White simply played at 34, omitting 32, Black would immediately play 'b', which would be the last large point of the fuseki. However, after the 32–33 exchange, White can live in the corner with White 'c', so Black 'b' would become pointless.




Black 33. If at 1 in Dia. 1, White would probably play 2 immediately. If at 1 in Dia. 2, White would force with 2 to 6, then switch to 34, satisfied with having made an effective forcing move.

White's continuation after Black 33 is 1 and 3 in Dia. 3. If this sequence is played, then White gains by having played 32 in the figure rather than 'd'. On the other hand, he loses a stone outright if Black later plays 'e', so one has to be careful about the timing of moves like 32.

White 38. The only move – the alternatives in Dias. 4 and 5 are not satisfactory.

Dia. 4. If White 1, Black takes the vital point with 2. White has to defend with 3, so Black



Fujisawa Shuko

Born in Yokohama on 6th June, 1925. Given name was Tamotsu, but later changed this to Hideyuki. However, he is almost universally known as Shuko, an alternative reading of the characters used to write Hideyuki. Became shodan in 1940, 9-dan in 1963. Won the 1st Prime Minister's Cup in 1957, the 1st Nihon Ki-in Number One Position tournament in 1959, the 5th Top Position tournament in 1960, the 1st Meijin tournament in 1962, the 2nd Pro Best Ten in 1965, the 10th Igo Championship in 1966, the 15th Oza title in 1967, the 16th Oza and the 5th Pro Best Ten in 1968, the 17th Oza, 16th NHK Cup and the 1st Haya-go Championship in 1969, the 9th Meijin title in 1970, the 1st Tengen title in 1976 and the 1st Kisei title in 1977. Shuko defeated Hashimoto Uтарo 4–1 in the 1st Kisei title match and has since defeated Kato 4–3, Ishida 4–1 and now Rin 4–1. Fujisawa Hosai, though five years older, is his nephew.

lives with 4 to 8 and also has a good forcing move at 'a' available for later. White does not get enough outside thickness to compensate.

Dia. 5. White 1 here is much worse, as Black counters with the tesuji of 2. The continuation is forced. White has to give Black splendid outside thickness and is not even able to capture Black's corner stones cleanly once Black connects at 14.

The moves to 43 were forced. However, White made a serious mistake with his next move and at one stroke his opponent took a commanding lead.





Figure 2 (44 - 61)




Dia. 6


Figure 2 (44 - 61). A resignable position

White 44, permitting Black to cut with 45 and 47, is a bad overplay. White should play the peaceful combination of 1 and 3 in Dia. 6, letting Black live with 6. Black would reinforce with 4 next, so White could switch to the top right with 5 and 7. This would give a leisurely game.

White 50 is another mistake, as White should poke his head out with 1 in Dia. 7. Black will



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

counter with 2, leading to the sequence to 13, but this is better than the result in the figure (though still favourable for Black, of course), because at least White has not been sealed in on the right.

White 54: Having to backtrack like this is painful, but White has no choice. If he were obstinate enough to extend at 1 in Dia. 8, Black would be able to get an approach-move ko with 2 etc.

White 58: White has to submit once again. If he captured with 1 and 3 in Dia. 9, Black would force with 2 and 4, then switch to 64. The cut by White at 'a' is too small to worry about.

The result to 61 is clearly a huge success for Black. Shuko commented later that he felt like resigning there and then.



Dia. 9

Dia. 10

Figure 3 (62 - 100). Complications

Black 67, 69: Black is trying to finish up the game as quickly as possible. He would welcome the ko in Dia. 10, as he has two absolute ko threats at 'a' and 'b'.

Black 71: Rin commented that this should be at 'c', as White 72 becomes the vital point. All the





Figure 3 (62 - 100)



Shuko seems to have enjoyed his lunch. At one stage he had given up hope, but now he was back in the game with a vengeance.



Dia. 14

'a', that is, 1 in Dia. 14, but the result would not be favourable.

Dia. 14. If White 1, Black counters with 2 to 10. If next White 'a', Black 'b' kills White; if instead White 'b', then Black 'a' and White 'c' follow, but this would give Black sente to switch to 13 in the figure.

Shuko switched to 4 in place of Dia. 14, but the sequence to 9 helps Black more than White, as it stabilises Black's group, while White does not have time to capture with 32, for Black would force with 33, then attack at 13. White should have omitted the whole sequence to 9, thus keeping open the threat of 'a' for later.

Black challenges White to a ko with 17, relying on his two ko threats at 19 and 25, but although he wins the ko, the result is not necessarily favourable. White captures two key stones with 22 and 30, thus securing all his unsettled groups.

Black 31 is the losing move: 32 is bigger. Rin admitted after the game that he had estimated the value of 32 at around fifteen points, but actually it was more like twenty. Black 31 is worth nowhere near twenty points.

White 40. White should play at 45 or attack at 'b'.




Figure 4 (101 – 150)
ko: 18, 21, 24, 27

Figure 4 (101 – 150). *Rin's mistaken calculation*

When Black made the hane at 1, Shuko realised that he had been misreading the position here. He had thought that he could answer Black 1 with





Figure 5 (151 – 200)



The strain of nursing that half-point win shows on Shuko's face at the end of the second game. The sympathetic onlooker is Hashimoto Shoji.

Figure 5 (151 – 200). Ishida's assessment

White 54. Another oversight by Shuko. After White 56, he expected Black 61 – White 57, but Black counters with the clamp at 57. This stone proves to be an effective sacrifice. White should simply have played 54 at 59.

Black 73. Hashimoto Shoji maintained that a hane at 76 would have been bigger and that it would have thrown the result into doubt. Once White plays 76, victory is assured.

White 86. At this point Ishida Yoshio, who gave a public commentary on the game at the Nihon Ki-in, asserted that White had a certain win by half a point. He also added that if the result turned out differently, it would not be his fault but that of the players. It would be nice to have his self-confidence.

Figure 6 (201 – 269). One last scare

The result of the game was exactly as Ishida predicted, but the final scenario was not perhaps quite what he had in mind. When Rin played 267, Shuko suddenly exclaimed that he had blundered again. 'Terrible', he groaned. 'Thrown away a point! How can I call myself a professional?' The reason for his agonising was that if White had




Figure 6 (201 – 269)

played 266 at 'a', he would have gained a point, thus winning by one and a half points. This does not mean that Ishida was out in his calculations, however, since actually Rin had gone wrong with the previous move. He could have played 265 at 'a' in sente, thus gaining a point. Correct play would therefore have given a half

point result anyway. Fortunately for Shuko, the errors cancelled each other out, but it was a while before Shuko calmed down after this alarm. It undoubtedly took Rin much longer to recover from the shock of letting slip a game in which at one stage he had had such a commanding lead.

White wins by 1/2 point.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 55 minutes

Black: 8 hours 58 minutes

Game Three

White: Rin Kaiho

Black: Fujisawa Shuko

date: 5th, 6th February, 1980

played in Kagoshima

Figure 1 (1 - 43). *A blindspot*

Black 15. Shuko dislikes the 'standard' joseki shown in Dia. 1, as pushing up with 1 etc. there means that Black is always one step behind White. In Dia. 1 Black can aim at attacking later at 'a' (see 'Dictionary of Basic Joseki', Vol. 3, p. 15), which he cannot do in Shuko's variation, but Black does have a good continuation at 'a' in the figure, aiming next at 'b'.

White 16. If at 33, Black 'c' would be just the right distance from Black's position at the bottom.

White 18. Rin also considered invading the corner at 'd'. His aim with 18 was to make Black's position below over-concentrated, but at the same time he ran the risk of making his own stones heavy.

White 28 is a little heavy. Rin commented that







Figure 1 (1 - 43)




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

7: connects

he should have followed Dia. 2, which would have given a leisurely game.

Black 37 - White 38. A careless exchange. Both players overlooked the fact that White could have played 38 at 1 in Dia. 3. Black can escape if he really wants to, but doing so would give White an excellent move at 7. Black barely manages to extricate himself, but at the cost of giving White excellent thickness. Black would therefore just give up his stone after White 1 and switch elsewhere. His replying at 38 transformed 37 into a good move which is useful to Black later on.

Black 39 is an excellent move. Kato and Takemiya agreed that Black had taken the lead. Incidentally, note that it is too early for White to attempt to do anything with his two stones on the right side. He would just get into trouble by playing 1 in Dia. 4, for after Black 2 to 8, his group would be heavy and would make a good target for Black to attack. However, the aji of this sequence helps to ensure life for the white group above.

White 42. White cannot permit Black to seal him in with 'e'. Also, if White later plays 'f', he could play the sequence in Dia. 4.

Black 43. The last large point of the fuseki. The game is going well for Black.